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Abstract Patient expertise in self-care is recognised as a cornerstone of disease
management in advanced welfare capitalist societies. When conceptualised within a
broader agenda of ‘engaged and active patients’ such expertise is expected to relieve UK
NHS resources significantly. However, although self-care is first and foremost an embodied
practice, grounded in the context of everyday life, state sponsored self-care support
initiatives such as the Expert Patients Programme operate a dualistic framework separating
cognitive and corporeal elements. Moreover, chronic disease management operates through
a framework that is increasingly biomedical, specialised and reductionist. Patients with
multiple morbidities in particular are not served well by this epistemological approach.
Utilising a ‘lived body’ conceptual paradigm and drawing upon qualitative data gathered
from interviews with patients with multi-morbidities, we explore embodied self-awareness
in health and illness and the everyday practices of chronic illness work. We examine how
patients integrate the different types of knowledge and practices resulting from interaction
with primary care professionals and highlight the implications for primary care practice, for
medical epistemology and for the democratic potentiality of the NHS.
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Introduction and Aims: What Place for Lay Expertise in Chronic
Disease Management (CDM)?
Over the past decade a new policy focus on patient chronic illness and
self-management has come to the fore as part of a care transition in which the
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official attention given to managing long-term conditions has begun to
recognise an epidemiological transition (the prevalence and incidence in chronic
conditions replacing acute conditions). State-sponsored self-management,
including the Expert Patients Programme (EPP), forms a central part of this care
transition, a policy that has placed patient action at the core of the work of
participating with personal illness management on the one hand but also,
on the other, of thereby helping the state to contain costs and implement a
policy of demand management (DH, 2005). One way in which policy has sought
to develop patients as experts is through the increased involvement of active
and informed patients in health-care decision-making and self-management in
primary care (Calnan and Gabe, 2009).
However, although self-care is above all an embodied practice, grounded in
the context of everyday life, which includes the support of lay care-givers in
a context of interdependency, both CDM support and self-care in primary
care consultations approach patients through a dualistic framework separ-
ating mental and bodily elements. Thus EPP valorises cognitive practices,
focusing on improving self-efficacy and imparting general coping strategies,
better breathing and healthy eating, improved communication and working
with health-care professionals (Rogers, 2009). As such, its patient model
resembles that of ‘Rational Man’ (sic) (Young, 1981) privileging objective,
logical and autonomous decision-making. In addition it is intended to
inculcate an ideal typical late-modern patient: responsible, self-directed and
managing her own health (ref removed). This, it is hoped, will remove the
need for secondary care and thus support the continued financial viability of
the NHS (Wanless, 2002).
Meanwhile, the structures and processes through which CDM is delivered
in primary care are, following the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes
Framework (QOF), increasingly standardised and bureaucratised around
adherence to specific measurements of bodily normality derived from epide-
miological evidence and applied to single diseases in isolation from others
that may be experienced simultaneously by patients (Checkland et al, 2008).
Indeed, the coexistence of conditions is very common: individuals living with
multiple long-term conditions, or multi-morbidities, currently make up 45 per
cent of the total number of approximately 17.5 million adults in the United
Kingdom living with chronic illness (DH, 2008). Although there is limited
ethnographic data describing self-care in the context of multi-morbidities, and
particularly data detailing the interplay between embodied practices of self-care
and primary care interventions, we know that, as well as presenting a
challenge to clinical care, self-care in the context of multi-morbidities
is more challenging than in the context of single conditions (Bayliss et al,
2003).
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Further exploration of lay expertise in this context, we suggest, will thus
serve two purposes. Epistemologically, there is a requirement to understand
the nature of lay expertise, how it is acquired and applied over the course of the
illness trajectory in the context of multi-morbidity, and how it works with other
kinds of knowledge, particularly biomedical knowledge. This would, secondly,
permit the design of appropriate and sensitive professional support for lay
self-care in this context. Our aims in this article are underpinned by sympathy
with previous research (for example Sullivan, 1986; Mol and Law, 2004), which
points to the necessity of transforming the epistemological as well as organi-
sational foundations of contemporary CDM to acknowledge the validity of
experiential knowledge and action based on practice grounded in everyday life.
The article aims to make a contribution towards this objective by utilising
qualitative data obtained via patient interviews. First, it will set out the
conceptual framework through which we have chosen to analyse our data,
namely that of the ‘lived body’. We will then describe, drawing on one detailed
case study, the practice of embodied self-awareness in health and illness and
the experiential knowledge and embodied processes (cognitive, corporeal and
social), which together form the foundation of ‘chronic illness work’ (Corbin
and Strauss, 1985). Next, we will set out the contrasting logic and practice that
underpins CDM in primary care before going on to consider how the patient
integrates these two different knowledges into her self-care. The concluding
sections will highlight the implications of the findings for primary care practice,
for medical epistemology and, more generally, for the democratic potentiality of
involving patients and citizens in health-care decision-making.
Ahead of this, however, a theoretical preamble will set out why we chose
to pursue our exploration of self-care through the lived body paradigm in
preference to alternative paradigms within the sociology of the body.
Bodies of Knowledge, Knowledge of Bodies
There are, broadly, two main perspectives in which sociological approaches to
the body can be situated. These are: (i) accounts that privilege social structure,
the degree to which body-as-object is inscribed by political and social dis-
courses from the outside: ‘what is done to the body’; and (ii) those that focus
on agency: the experience of the body-subject within her social world, or ‘what
the body does’ (Crossley, 1995, 1996; Howson and Inglis, 2001). Although
this distinction (again, broadly) adheres to the emic/etic divide, discrete
perspectives may be more or less dualistic in their approach to the body, in a
way that does not divide neatly between the two categories.
Knowing as practice
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Meanwhile, in terms of sociological research into the experience of people
living with chronic illness, we can identity three dominant traditions: (i) social
constructionist, (ii) narrative identity and (iii) lived body paradigms. Social
constructionism approaches the illness experience of bodies in terms of history
(genealogy) and politics, critically examining the role of medicine in
constructing discursive categories of sickness and disease, defining what is
‘normal’ for a body and shaping the subjectivities of patients accordingly.
Although the body is a key site for the operation of power in this paradigm,
it can resemble an object with very little attention given either to its fleshy
characteristics or to the experiential dimension (for example Turner, 2001).
Second, narrative approaches look at the experience of illness and disability
through a focus, derived from Mead, on the social shaping of self and identity.
Although this usefully blends social, cultural and individual elements it has
tended to adopt a predominantly cognitive view of the self with more emphasis
accorded to the way the self restores biographical meaning and adjusts to
changes in identity following impairment or other changes to the body (Kelly
and Field, 1996). Finally, the lived body approach as it has developed in
the humanities and social sciences, drawing on the phenomenology of
Merleau-Ponty in particular, focuses on the corporeal experience of illness and
disability within the lifeworld, highlighting experiential aspects such as changes
to embodied self-awareness, motility, spatiality and temporality. Its limitations
are those Bourdieu (2000) identified and sought to remedy through the theory
of the habitus, specifically its neglect in theoretical terms of the influence
of socio-structural factors on embodied dispositions (a neglect deriving from its
philosophical roots).
Although all three paradigms provide helpful insights through which to
approach the questions we set ourselves – the nature of lay expertise in
self-care – we chose to utilise the lived body perspective as most apposite. More
recently applied to bodies in health and illness by contemporary philosophers
such as Drew Leder (1990), S.K. Toombs (1992) and others, its utility for the
sociology of the body has been richly demonstrated by sociologists such as
Simon Williams, Gillian Bendelow (Williams, 1996; Williams and Bendelow,
1998) and Nick Crossley (1995, 1996, 2001), who have also demonstrated
its possibilities as a method to explain situated experience (see also Young,
2005). In terms of understanding the expertise of self-care in particular, this
utility has several dimensions. First, it redresses the emphasis given to cognitive
processes and puts the body firmly back into the centre of the account. Second
it attends to the experience – the ‘chronically ill body’, ‘self-care’ – that is social
constructed (Turner, 2001). Third, and perhaps most importantly, it adopts a
non-dualistic approach to knowledge that convincingly challenges: the primacy
of critical reflection; the notion of an ‘inner mind’ relating to an independent
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outer object; the idea that action is underpinned by (explicit or implicit)
theorising; and the superiority attached to objectivity, autonomy and detach-
ment towards the social world (see Dreyfus, 1991). The lived body paradigm
suggests that our experience of everyday embodied practices is itself a fact
about the world, compatible with genuine scientific enquiry, and indeed without
which understanding biomedicine remains phenomenologically inadequate
(Carman, 2008).
Although in recent years the lived body perspective has contributed to the
project of rendering the sociology of chronic illness more embodied, we note a
parallel trend in the sociology of disability that is reintroducing impairment
into the disability debate (Williams, 2006). Although previously discussions of
the experience of disability were framed predominantly within the terms of the
social model of disability, a Cartesian model similar to that found in biomedi-
cine has resulted where, as Hughes and Paterson point out, ‘both treat [the
body] as a pre-social, inert, physical object, as discrete, palpable and separate
from the self’ (1997, p. 329). Thus, an understanding of the phenomenological
parameters of self-care is as relevant and important, by this reading, to socio-
logical understanding of disability and impairment (and in certain circum-
stances ageing too), as it is to the understanding of chronic illness.
We discuss these parameters next.
The Lived Body: Embodied Self-awareness of Health and Illness
With his rejection of Descartes’ approach to perception, Merleau-Ponty posits
embodiment as the basis of experience and perception as the grounds of sub-
jectivity, with the primary function of perception being not contemplation but
practical action (Crossley, 1995). To understand is thus an act, not a cognitive
contemplation, consisting in competent bodily action ‘whether that be the
action of applying a learned mathematical formula or of driving a car’ (Crossley,
1995, p. 55). Two key aspects of the body’s role in perception are identified
by Merleau-Ponty (1962) as the ‘body schema’ and ‘motor intentionality’. The
former suggests a dynamic ability to engage with the world in terms of postures
and bodily behaviours that make acts possible: the body is ‘polarized by its
tasks’, it exists ‘towards them’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 115) via the body
schema. Motor intentionality, on the other hand, refers to pre-reflective, skilful
physical behaviour: a non-cognitive intelligent bodily awareness of self and
environment (Carman, 2008). The combination of both in practical knowledge,
or ‘praktognosia’, is pre-linguistic and habitual. Above all ‘the world is not what
I think but what I live through’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. xviiii). Intentionality,
meaning and experience when sufficiently attuned can facilitate one’s ‘best grip
Knowing as practice
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on the world’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962), a set of bodily attitudes that enable us
to place ourselves within the world most harmoniously.
Somewhat ironically, the lived body also demonstrates the experiential basis
for the persistence of dualism in western consciousness. Indeed, an element of
bodily self-awareness is the experience of oneself both as subject and at times as
object thus actually seemingly reaffirming the dualist approach favoured by
medicine (Leder, 1990). For example, although we may be aware of particular
outer elements of the body when using them – such as hands or feet – this
requires the enlistment of the rest of the body in a quiescent and supportive
‘background attitude’, summed up in the notion of figure-ground gestalt. One
can then talk about a ‘phenomenological anatomy’ of the lived body in terms of
the usual habits of presence and absence, the activities they entail and the
world-relations associated with them (Leder, 1990). In this schema, the inner
organs lie mostly beyond conscious perception. However, at the same time they
do participate in our experiential state and constitute part of one undivided
bodily intentionality so that, for example we experience fatigue in multi-layered
terms as a combination of metabolic processes in the muscles, changes in the
chemical composition in the blood, hormonal shifts and mood or mental dis-
turbance, which in combination effect a qualitative transformation of one’s
entire being-in-the-world (Leder, 1990).
Illness disrupts the usual phenomenological anatomy. One becomes
conscious of one’s body or part(s) of one’s body in a way that Leder terms
‘dys-appearance’ (defined as the appearance of the body in a ‘dys’ – bad, hard,
ill – state) and which disrupts practices, roles and relationships with others
in everyday life. This then requires the imposition of some new coherence in
terms of biographical continuity and coping strategies. Transformations in
bodily awareness are particularly durable in chronic illness, which may be
experienced as a prolonged, if fluctuating, set of tensions that frustrates
the familiar features of embodiment, constricting one’s sense of space, trans-
forming temporality, impeding bodily intentionality, and thence self and world
(Toombs, 1992). In multi-morbidity, these fluctuations and the change in
gestalt-patterns associated with them, will certainly be all the more complex
and nuanced.
Williams (1996) has helpfully synthesised the corporeal and cognitive
dimensions of this experience in a more sociologically focused explanatory
framework as follows. Illness leads to a state of ‘dys-embodiment’ or the
‘resurrection of dualism’, wherein bodies become negatively conscious of
themselves and taken-for-granted relationships between body, self and society
become problematised. Following struggles at all these levels of experience,
individuals may succeed in realigning mind and body, self and society, through
a range of biographical and practical adjustments leading to the restoration
Pickard and Rogers
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of a sense of continuity or normality (Bury, 1982). This leads to a new
‘re-embodiment’, in terms of a non-dualistic body-self albeit one that is
achieved, and is the product of work, rather than something taken-for-granted;
all the more so in that, in chronic illness, this achievement is frequently
unstable and may require further ongoing work. Thus the chronically ill person
learns to juggle an ultimately irresolvable set of tensions over which s/he must
impose some sense of coherence, if re-embodiment is to be maintained (Corbin
and Strauss, 1985). In this process, patients may choose to preserve aspects of
their identity or habitus at the cost of symptom management. An obvious ex-
ample is where the individual may resist using a wheelchair, despite significant
impairment, because of its symbolic character that is suggestive of disability
and thus threatening both to self-perception and social identity (for example
Toombs, 1992). As Turner expresses it, ‘Embodiment and enselfment are
mutually dependent, interdependent and reinforcing projects’ (2001, p. 252).
One important aspect of chronic illness work is the necessity to integrate
self-care with interactions with professionals, involving the incorporation of
medical regimens based on a radically different approach towards the meaning
of chronic illness together with a contrasting knowledge of the body. We
consider this next.
Epistemologies of the Body in Primary Care
As we noted earlier, it has been observed that CDM within primary care is
increasingly situated within a biomedical framework wherein symptom man-
agement within ‘normal’ values is the dominant or exclusive priority (Checkland
et al, 2008). CDM in UK general practice is driven by a ‘pay for performance’
scheme called the QOF introduced by the 2004 General Medical Services General
Practitioner (GP) contract, which utilises standardised protocols for the man-
agement of specific common chronic diseases. These are predominantly clinically
focused: for example, the (2010) QOF for diabetes gives a required range of
normality for readings of blood pressure and HbA1c and also categorises the
status of the foot of the diabetic into several discrete categories according to the
presence of morbidity. These protocols are applied to individual patients by
means of annual disease reviews, which are initiated by standard call and recall
letters to patients classified as falling into the relevant (single) disease categories.
They are administered by nurses who increasingly specialise in these discrete
areas, overseen by GPs who lead in these disease areas and who carry out the
annual medication review (Checkland et al, 2008).
This protocol-based approach, privileging evidence-based medicine, has been
described as inevitably limiting the ability of patients to introduce their own
Knowing as practice
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priorities (for example Rhodes et al, 2006). It also restricts GPs’ abilities to
engage with the lived experience of multi-morbidity for a variety of reasons,
relating both to the nature of evidence and to the structure of doctor–patient
interaction contained within the framework. Not only does the ‘evidence’ base
of the protocol privilege the methodology of probabilistic sampling of large
numbers over the particularly of individual bodies (Byrne, 2004) but the layout
of the templates associated with each specific disease framework leaves the
GP little or no room to record data, including social or biographical context or,
indeed, any medical impressions that are difficult to quantify (Berg, 1997). As
Blaxter (2009) observes, although it may no longer be entirely accurate – owing
to changes in medical education as well as shifts in patient attitudes – to oppose
the ‘world of biomedicine’ to the ‘lifeworld’, in this context the significant
opposition may be the qualitative views of the patient/doctor versus the
‘evidence’. Furthermore, increasing specialisation inevitability fragments
continuity of care, which will further compromise clinicians’ engagement with
the patients’ lifeworlds.
In approaching the body in narrowly clinical terms, the framework does not
take account of the fact that, for example in the case of diabetes self-
management, deciding to aim for a higher or lower blood sugar level is not
simply a clinical but also an existential choice as to, for example, whether one
would prefer to risk blindness or kidney failure in future years for the purpose
of avoiding comas that make it dangerous to drive in the short term (Mol and
Law, 2004). In multi-morbidity, prioritising treatment for one particular
condition may have positive effects, for example, on one’s social life but, si-
multaneously, negative effects on other bodily conditions. Thus, the CDM
version of ‘health’ as something assessed through measurement contrasts
with that of many lay people who perceive health in a way that bridges the
physiological and social, such as the ability to do the things they want to do
(Blaxter, 2004). It is also possible that in the case of multi-morbidities the aim of
achieving a certain ‘number’ for one condition may disrupt the gestalt flow in
which patients have learned to self-manage the whole and thus may in practice
introduce instability or deterioration.
Methodology
The following data derive from qualitative research that examined CDM
processes in primary care for patients with multi-morbidities. Following ethical
approval, patients who lived with two or more chronic conditions (left
undefined) were selected by practice managers randomly from their lists and
letters of invitation were sent out explaining the research. Four patients in each
Pickard and Rogers
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practice who gave their formal consent were interviewed up to five times each
over the course of a year by one researcher, for consistency. Carers were
interviewed where appropriate because, against the model of the ‘autonomous,
rational patient’ found in policy documents, we anticipated that self-care would
involve a strong element of intersubjectivity and interdependence, including
family and familiars. The longitudinal approach aimed to chart changes over
time, in terms of the interaction between health, life events and contacts with
health-care providers in primary and secondary care and to capture as far as
possible ‘in real time’ patients’ varying methods for self-managing.
Questions at initial meetings aimed to explore the conditions with which
patients had been diagnosed, the history of the illness trajectory including
contact with health-care professionals and self-management techniques. Sub-
sequent interviews explored recent changes in the stability of one or more
conditions as well as returning, in greater depth, to aspects covered in the first
interview. This was particularly helpful as patients’ tacit knowledge required
time and patience to draw to the surface and could not always be elicited
through direct questioning.
We have elected to present data in the form of one case study, that of ‘Rita’,
(not her real name), a patient in ‘Treetops’ practice in a deprived inner-city area
of Greater Manchester. Although focusing on this one case sacrifices breadth
in favour of depth, this approach was chosen because of the opportunity to
provide rich detail at a micro-level, the better to reveal the interplay between
different kinds of practices and different types of knowledge. Rita had been
diagnosed with a wide range of chronic illnesses of many years standing,
associated with an original diagnosis of diabetes, and including coronary artery
disease, moderately advanced chronic kidney disease (CKD), hypertension,
osteoporosis, neuropathy and gout. She has contact with a wide range of
professionals in varied settings and receives annual and interim disease-specific
reviews at her general practice for the diabetes and CKD, respectively, arranges
frequent ad hoc appointments at the practice with a range of GPs and nurses,
and in addition attends outpatient clinics at two different hospitals for diabetes
and CKD, respectively. She had not been offered any opportunity to attend
self-management training programmes. She takes approximately 12 different
medications daily.
The data will be presented in terms of three themes. First, focusing on
embodied self-awareness, we will examine the interrelationship of Rita’s
various morbidities in corporeal terms, how they fit together in combinations
that are complementary, neutral or antagonistic and how bodily knowledge in
this context includes ability to read and interpret signs relating to different
origins or causations. Second, we will examine the situated dimensions of her
chronic illness work, including maintaining multiple regimens, medicines and
Knowing as practice
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therapeutics in the context of everyday and valued practices, roles and re-
lationships and the interplay between them. Third, we will look at the role
played by health-care professionals and the place of biomedical regimens in
supporting this illness work.
Rita: Contextual Background
Rita, an East-African born former nurse of Indian heritage, is in her early fifties,
married with one grown up son who still lives at home. She developed insulin-
dependent diabetes as a child and during the past 15 years the additional
conditions noted above also emerged. Her tiny modern terrace home was in a
treeless housing estate in a post-industrial socio-economically deprived
area and she possessed considerably more cultural/educational than financial
capital.
In terms of her contact with clinicians at Treetops, the GP she sees most
frequently is Dr Whippet, the senior partner, who leads on CKD and with whom
she has a relationship extending back many years. He is a ‘traditional’ GP who
has been at the practice some 30 years and prides himself in living in the area
and consciously continuing the heritage of the practice back to its original
founder at the turn of the previous century. While she sees him for her regular
CKD review, Rita also attends frequently for ad hoc appointments (up to six
times a month); if she is unable to secure a timely appointment with him then,
as second choice, she sees Dr Samuels, a younger partner who has been at the
practice some 10 years and who leads on stroke (and thus does not administer
her disease review). She sees Dr Clarke, a part-time female practitioner, for the
diabetes review only. Outside of this, her disease has progressed to the extent
that she also sees secondary care clinicians based at two clinics at two different
hospitals, with a general physician and renal specialist team, respectively, at
approximately six monthly intervals. Dr Whippet reviews any new medication
prescribed for Rita by her hospital specialists.
One of us SP interviewed Rita at her home on three separate occasions: the
first time, osteoporosis and gout were particularly troubling her; on the second
occasion, her kidney disease was prominent, owing to the effect of receiving
news regarding a sharp deterioration in function; on the third the kidney
function remained foregrounded, following a discussion in which she was
informed of the likelihood of needing kidney transplantation. During the latter
part of this last meeting Rita’s 26 year-old son joined us and discussed his
own role in giving care and supporting his mother’s self-care. A further two
telephone conversations took place subsequent to the last interviews for the
purpose of clarifying certain details in the material.
Pickard and Rogers
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Embodied Self-awareness in the Context of Multi-morbidity
During the vicissitudes of her illness, Rita had gone from monitoring her
blood sugar to managing the consequences of multi-morbidities associated
with several other organs. She describes the daily experience as ‘Like a juggling
acty’ and elaborates:
You start off, have I got any swelling on my feet, then come down and
you think, right let’s check the blood sugars and see what they’re like.
My bones are worse in the morning y and then it’s the thing how you
progress through the day.
Rita illustrates how embodied self-awareness, although built on a pre-
objective relationship with our bodies and the world, is suffused with meaning
that is necessarily social and cultural. Thus, she has learnt to make con-
sideration of her blood sugar needs of primary salience in her self-awareness,
although it is now tacit. These needs are, she describes, ‘a foundationy (in) an
interlinked chain’. All conditions arise from the diabetes, explicitly or implicitly,
but each has an effect on the whole: ‘If one of them is weak, it starts, sort of,
breaking’. Any condition arising outside of this has the potential to adversely
affect it: for example, a cold or infection raises her blood sugar level sig-
nificantly with effects lasting between 4 and 6 weeks. Moreover, the fluctuations
of sensations localisable in body parts and organs located at the surface of
the body – temples, ears, feet and so on – present clues to the status of
underlying conditions located in the recessive inner body: that her gout was no
longer troubling her indicated to her that her kidneys were stabilising.
Elements of Rita’s ‘interlinked chain’ variously surge to the forefront or ebb to
the background in a constantly shifting dance. There are a variety of reasons
why one condition will assume prominence. Some arise from the body itself,
as in the case of pain: when experiencing the severe osteoporosis-related
backache to which she is prone everything else recedes. Others arise from
interaction with health-care providers, such as receiving test results: her kidney
disease was in the ‘back of her mind’ until test results indicated reduced
function: ‘So then this osteoporosis thing gets to the back and then you bring
the kidney things in the front’. Other reasons stem from her personal biography:
so for example, diabetes, normally her key priority, will recede from her
attention when valued activities demand it. One of the examples Rita gives is
that of pilgrimages to Mecca, which she has carried out three times. In each
case, her blood sugar level went ‘through the roof’ but for once this did not
matter to Rita as long as she made it through each day.
Through constant surveillance of her body Rita has learnt to interpret
phenomenological states linked with multi-morbidities in a sort of hermeneutic
Knowing as practice
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circle wherein surface and recessive aspects of the body form one variegated
but unified existential state or condition. She describes, for example, four
distinct types of fatigue each linked with different ‘silent’ organs or body
systems. With CKD, ‘you’re sleeping a lot, that sort of tiredness’. With getting
over a cold, ‘it’s tired, a bit like weary-tired’. When her blood sugars are high,
it’s more like lethargy: ‘You don’t want to get up. You don’t want to do any-
thing’. Alternatively when they are very low: ‘You float away into this sleep,
and you’re like you’re on air’. Similarly there are three contrasting types of
headache: a hyperglycaemic headache is very severe and ‘you can actually
feel your arteries pumping’. A hypoglycaemic headache is ‘like a hangover
and your eyes feel heavy’. A common-and-garden headache is different again:
a tight band at temples and neck. Leg pain too can be differentiated according to
its origin in either high blood sugar levels, neuropathy or gout. These responses
are unique and cannot thus be captured either in medical textbooks or self-care
manuals. Such knowledge enables Rita to detect subtle changes to the norm,
although they may then require further ‘detective work’: ‘Your feet don’t swell
up just because there’s something wrong with your kidneys, it could be
anything’. Sometimes the complexity of this task may lead to her seeking
professional interpretation, although the hermeneutic element involved nor-
mally requires Rita’s continued input. For example, she noticed an elevation in
her hypertension as follows: ‘When you lie down, you can hear “bang, bang,
bang” or you can hear like a hissing sound’. The senior GP partner, Dr Whippet,
suggested it was a problem with her ear drum:
And I kept thinking there is nothing wrong with my ears, I know it’s not
my ears. Anywayy they introduced another new heart medication and
then one night I suddenly thought, hmmy . It’s gone.
This is an example of Rita being not just self-aware – the non-thematic
proprioception (or body’s awareness of itself) of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomen-
ology – but also aware of the effects of medical interventions on her body
(Mol and Law, 2004). However, despite her dense experiential knowledge,
her body remains, intractably, unpredictable, unlike that of a machine, and is
never fully ‘mastered’ (as ultimately no body can be); sometimes her blood
sugar levels fluctuate for no obvious reason, despite eating the same things
every day and injecting the same dosage of insulin, perhaps because she has
forgotten to take into account ‘small things’ like a walk earlier in the day or the
weather, or perhaps for no reason at all. Sometimes, it is her son who notices
changes from Rita’s norm (thereby highlighting the importance of knowledge
as continuity in this context) and takes remedial action: ‘I can be sat here
and my blood sugar level can be 2.5 and getting lower and I’ll be fine but I don’t
recognize the signs, Raj is the one who recognizes the signs.’ Raj also knows
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how to ‘distinguish’ chest pains relating to muscular problems or side effects
of medication from angina, according to her mode of breathing, her general
demeanour and her pallor, in a way that supplements, reinforces or even (in the
case of a hypo) contradicts Rita’s self-knowledge. At other times, her embodied
self-awareness may prove to be out of alignment with biological events and
thus contradicted by test results. Thus she has ‘no idea’ what the kidney
function reading will reveal when she attends her outpatients’ appointment at
the renal unit; levels of creatinine or urea in the blood or protein in the urine
are beyond her perceptual grasp until and unless they produce signs affecting
urination, back pain or fatigue, and then only indirectly, and by way of
influencing perceptual states such as fatigue or headache or affecting parts of
the body furnished with more nerve endings and receptors such as in the case
of gout. Finally, there are times when demands ensuing from one part of her
body means that she attends to this without considering the consequences for
the rest, as during a recent episode of severe backpain when she took painkillers
and ‘totally forgot’ about its detrimental effect on her kidneys.
Self-care as Effecting and Maintaining Re-embodiment
Re-embodiment for Rita involves constant work. Medication for any condition
can raise her blood sugar level, which is then a struggle to normalise. Rita
chooses to maintain her blood sugar level at the lower end of the normal range,
despite the risk of hypos, including most dangerously in the night, as well as
the concerns of her family but, in discussion, reveals an embodied logic for
choosing to risk hypoglycaemia over other possibilities for her body. First, she
believes that higher blood sugar is a ‘slow time-bomby tick-tick-tick’, risking
almost certain damage to eyes, kidney and nervous system. Second, her body
‘agrees’ with lower blood sugar in other ways: not only can she function nor-
mally most of the time at a very low level but hypoglycaemia is associated for
her with ‘pleasant’ feelings ‘a bit like being high’. By contrast, her blood sugar
level has only to creep up to an average of 7.6mmol/l – not particularly high by
clinical standards – for her to start to feel ‘thirsty and ill’. There is a third, and
key, factor that facilitates this choice, namely her son’s presence in the home,
whom she describes as ‘properly trained’ to manage a hypo should it occur.
Rita’s use of medical technology facilitates her bodily self-knowledge. She
describes herself as being ‘on the spot 80 per cent of the time’ in terms of
her own awareness of her blood sugar, but symptoms may be masked in the
remaining cases as a result of the interactions with other morbidities. For
example, frequent urination, a once-reliable sign of low blood sugar, is also now
associated with medication for CKD. Its source can, fortunately, be clarified
by using her blood testing kit. Technology has also enabled her to maintain
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valued roles, practices and identity. Thus, a change in diabetes medication
several years before – to a longer lasting type no longer requiring refrigeration –
meant that she was able to perform the Hajj (the annual Moslem pilgrimage
to Mecca and Medina in Saudia Arabia already noted) for the first time. She has
subsequently gone on the Hajj on three occasions over the past 8 years (on one
occasion discharging herself against her doctors’ advice from a cardiac ward in
order to make her flight). Despite the very high blood sugar readings – up to
20mmol/l at times – experienced during the trip, she believes it to have had a
very positive effect on her in that it restored to her a sense of her body’s
possibilities, which for her is one meaning of health itself: ‘You think, I’ve got
these problems but yes, I can do this. So that means I can’t be that bad. It helps
you cope’. This has a broader role in facilitating health as her religious faith has
sustained her in both cognitive and practical ways. Cognitively, it provides
both meaning and a way of coping, while sustaining biographical continuity.
She says that it is her conviction that ‘if (God) has given you this problem,
then He is the one that is going to help you cope with it’. Practically, she
explains that keeping Ramadan has helped inculcate in her the ascetic
dispositions required by diabetes self-management as, while the fasting
associated with it is not beneficial in the short term, causing the blood sugar to
rise alarmingly, nevertheless in terms of more permanent dispositions beneficial
to self-care, it ‘teaches you a lot of self discipline, eating and drinking’.
Diet and nutrition provide an excellent example of the difficulties in self-care
where tensions may coexist within and between her biological body, her roles and
her relationships. Therefore although she had modified her diet many years ago in
accordance with her diabetes, when coronary artery disease was responsible for a
heart attack requiring two angioplasties she was obliged to make further changes
by checking not just sugar and carbohydrates but fat content also. This necessi-
tated preparing separate meals for herself and for her family on a daily basis. It also
set her apart from friends and family during celebrations and communal meals:
Yes, because you see while everybody is at the table [putting food] on
their plate, you’re weighing up, you’re stood back weighing up how much
of this can I have and how much of that. And they would say, ‘What are
you thinking? Get the food on your plate’.
One complicating factor for Rita is that although certain foods are promoted
for their health-giving properties, they may not serve all her conditions equally
well. So, she explains,
If you look at the heart situation it says eat lots of fruit, eat lots of
vegetables y but the fruit is sugary so you can’t just eat fruit and
vegetablesy . So although it is good for you, in a diabetes sense it is not.
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The Role of Health-care Professionals in (Re)embodiment
The frequency of Rita’s attendance at ‘Treetops’ means that she has regular
contact with at least two of her GPs outside disease reviews and sees a third
GP exclusively for disease reviews. As we have noted, she also sees two hospital
specialists (or specialist teams) This then presents an opportunity to compare
differing approaches to supporting her self-management, associated with dif-
ferent styles of interaction and different types of knowledge.
Dr Whippet is key to Rita’s successful self-management and one way in
which she describes his central role (which is also, to a lesser extent, played
by Dr Samuels) is in terms of his appreciation of the instability of the
re-embodiment she has painstakingly achieved and a reluctance to upset it by
introducing new medication. So Dr Whippet will not prescribe medication
‘unless it is absolutely necessary’ and Dr Samuels ‘prescribed’ her Jewish
chicken soup instead of antibiotics for a heavy cold. She calls this approach
taking ‘a step back to look at the broader view of things’, a cautious approach
comparable to her own.
She compares this favourably to the more reductionist approach of the third
GP, Dr Clarke, whom she mainly sees within the context of disease reviews and
of her general hospital physician, Dr Barot, and which Rita calls ‘tunnel vision’.
The ‘tunnel vision’ physicians are also more inclined to suggest pharmaceutical
intervention, their focus being on the (single) disease rather than the (broader)
implications in terms of her other illnesses and their interplay. For example,
Dr Barot prescribed steroids for pain because he felt that they would ‘only’ raise
her blood sugar level ‘for four or five days’ – unaware of the delicacy of her
re-embodiment and its contrasting experience of temporality. She relates
angrily, ‘And I was thinking, to you it might only be four or five days but for me,
it’s going to take me two to three weeks to bring it back to normal!’
As noted, she relies upon her GPs to carry out tests to investigate signs and
symptoms or confirm any suspicions she might entertain. A pain in her knee
initially diagnosed as osteoporosis was subsequently discovered to be gout;
pain in her back initially suspected to be kidney pain was discovered following
an MRI scan to be osteoporosis. Sometimes Rita requests specific tests, as when
she ‘knew’ that a pain in her chest required an angiograph as it was ‘not
muscular pain’ and Dr Whippet expressed his confidence in her judgement.
These examples illustrate the importance of lay and professional interpretive
logic proceeding in partnership in solving these ongoing puzzles, and of valuing
patients’ experiential knowledge as equally important as their own.
The contribution that Rita values most highly from her clinicians is their
knowledge of her as a ‘person’ not just a patient, including both her clinical
and personal history, which enables them to tailor their advice so that it is
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appropriate to her everyday activities as well as biography. As we have already
noted in the case of her son’s observation, understanding of her normal stance
of being-in-the-world is crucial for an understanding of morbid changes to that.
Dr Samuels, for example, will regularly begin a consultation with questions
about her family, knowing that Raj in particular is a key factor in Rita’s self-care.
Dr Whippet has been similarly supportive of her performing the Hajj; rather
than warning her against possible ill effects he supplied her with antibiotics and
other medication to self-medicate should she need it while there, saying ‘my job
is to support you’.
By contrast, appointments at the hospital, often with doctors she has never
met before within the renal team, generate great anxiety. During her most recent
appointment, the new specialist informed her that she would need to lose
weight:
I said, ‘Why? My diabetes is in control! y . I don’t want to be Kate
Moss!’And he said, ‘To get onto kidney transplant, you have to be three
and a half stone lighter for you to be even considered.’ And I’m saying,
‘Oh, right, okay.’ Well, when I came home I couldn’t stop crying, and I’m
thinking, oh, nobody’s ever said to me, you knowy because I’ve never
looked that far aheady
She immediately made an appointment to see Dr Whippet. She recalls:
‘Dr Whippety he said, “I wouldn’t worry about it, it’s okay, you just carry on
what you’re doingy . At the moment all you need to concentrate on is to make
sure that your diabetes is well controlled.”’ This response supported her
self-care, clinically and existentially in that it contained her fears and directed
her attention positively to tangible activities within her control and so helped
her to re-establish her ‘best grip’ on the world.
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this article we have argued for an understanding of the more grounded
and embodied aspects of living with multiple chronic conditions and an
appreciation of the particular type of knowledge underpinning it. Utilising a
lived body perspective, and drawing on the phenomenological approach asso-
ciated with Merleau-Ponty in particular, we have been able to demonstrate that
self-care employs an embodied, practical knowledge that is very different from
the abstract, rational model of patient knowledge assumed in programmes like
EPP. In lived reality, our patient demonstrates that knowledge is not something
you have or acquire but something you do, and in a social, biographical and
clinical context, that contains objects and other people as well as one’s own
Pickard and Rogers
16 r 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1477-8211 Social Theory & Health 1–20
AU
TH
OR
 CO
PY
body. An understanding of the practice of embodied self-care, we suggest, is key
to effective professional support and may serve as a starting point from which to
question CDM’s focus on clinical indicators derived from epidemiological
evidence and applied to single diseases. Of course, the call to integrate patients’
lived experience into medicine is hardly a new one but such calls have mostly
suggested adding this perspective to the clinical method (Sullivan, 1986) in a
way that resembles the biopsychosocial approach and also risks its limitations
(Armstrong, 1995; Mol and Law, 2004). From our data we would instead concur
with Mol and Law’s (2004) conclusion that, building from the epistemological
starting point of knowledge as practical activity,
medicine should come to recognize that what it has to offer is not a
knowledge of isolated bodies but a range of diagnostic and therapeutic
interventions into lived bodies, and thus into people’s daily lives.
(2004, p. 58)
In fact, several physicians in our study do appear to understand this; often,
however, they find themselves at odds with a protocol-based system that is
increasingly biomedical and reductionist. Indeed, we do not wish to set lay
and medical knowledge against one another nor to accord one superiority
over the other, in whichever direction. That being so, we cannot concur with
arguments (for example Prior, 2003) that point out the limitations on lay
‘expertise’ in terms of their inadequate understanding of technical knowledge
such as disease causation and management. We do not accept uncritically
biomedicine’s definition of expertise and evidence, nor the implicit dualist
ontology hidden within it, but rather resist their reification as social facts.
Not to challenge such assumptions amounts to locking sociology into the
structures of the ‘governing mode’ that perpetuate this power/knowledge
nexus (for example Smith, 1974). In the words of Bourdieu, social science can
unmask the strategies of the dominant because its goal is ‘not only knowledge
of an objecty but knowledge of the knowledge – practical and scientific – of a
given object of knowledge’ (2000, p. 83). The lived body approach, we hope
we have shown, provides a keen conceptual means to execute this challenge as
it demonstrates clearly that self-care expertise lies not in a technology or
rational understanding but simply in the embodied and practical act of doing
self-care. To paraphrase Merleau-Ponty, expertise in self-care just is self-care as
practised.
In our case study, two of Rita’s GPs understood that for Rita successful
management of diabetes and the co-morbidities associated with it was about
far more than achieving a standard target physiological reading. Rather,
it was about integrating bodily management into life strategies, and thus
neither took predominance over the others but all contributed to a sustained
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re-embodiment. Thus, blood sugar levels were consistent with Rita’s life
choices supported by the actions of her son and the sustenance of her
religious beliefs. This also necessitated that at times glycaemic control had to
be sacrificed for these other valued practices. Together, these bodily and
social elements all form part of Rita’s phenomenological anatomy and it is to
this, not the textbook version of anatomy, that medicine contributes. At the
same time, clinical techniques can be accommodated fully into such practical
knowledge in the understanding that, as we noted from the experience of
‘dys-appearance’, objectivity is a ‘normal’ aspect of bodily experience, just as
much as subjectivity (Jackson, 1996), although not one that should be
deemed more legitimate.
This accommodation, we suggest, is difficult if not impossible to achieve
with formal QOF-led CDM practices as they currently exist. Their concentra-
tion on single diseases, and the ever-increasing specialisation and bureau-
cratisation witnessed in primary care and other branches of medicine, points
to a tendency in human consciousness to impose order and classify experience
into clear categories, where multi-morbidities, with all their ambiguity,
threaten to disrupt such order. Where such ambiguity can be accommodated
in GP–patient interactions outside standard reviews, general practice remains
most receptive of all branches of medicine to incorporating the lay perspec-
tive, inasmuch as GPs ‘are faced with the challenges of providing bridges
between the uncertainties of clinical practice and biomedicine’s claims to
epistemological privilege’ (Busby et al, 1997, p. 94). The concern then is how
GPs can integrate the standardised demands of QOF with the individualised
requirements of their patients. Finally, we also suggest that the valorisation
of knowledge as practice within medicine’s epistemology would also play
an important role in terms of wider processes of democracy in the NHS.
Hierarchical structures and processes are, after all, intrinsically linked with
the dualism in which the biomedical tradition is rooted and which has his-
torically been associated with control through the construction of order that
once ‘discovered’ through rational thinking can then be imposed upon others
(Jackson, 1996). By contrast, knowing as practice supports subalternity,
which suggests a refusal to privilege detached intellectual activity over the
rich and complex expertise that is emergent directly from the lifeworld.
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